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This article considers the constitutional requirements and implications of Article 50 
TEU for the European Union. Despite its rapid rise to fame in the aftermath of the 23 
June 2016 referendum on British membership of the European Union, this sparsely 
worded provision raises more questions that it answers. While currently under 
intense scrutiny from the perspective of UK constitutional law, the key terms and 
aspects of Article 50 itself have received less attention. Yet once the withdrawal 
process commences, it will also, and crucially so, be governed by the law of the 
European Union. 
 
The article’s key argument is that the withdrawal needs to be compliant with EU 
constitutional law, if the EU is to preserve its character as a supranational order that 
creates rights and obligations for institutions, Member States and private persons. 
This will have significant implications for the negotiations themselves, and the future 
relationship between the UK and the EU. 
 
The article commences (Section II) with a discussion of why an EU constitutional law 
based reading of Article 50 is the only justifiable interpretation, over and above an 
international law reading. As part of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) and its 
inherently constitutionalist features, Article 50 is directly constitutive of what the EU is. 
Originally drafted in the context of the Convention on the Future of Europe, it deals 
with fundamental questions regarding the allocation of rights and responsibilities in 
the EU polity. The UK cannot deviate from the EU’s reading of the Treaty by, for 
instance, insisting on an international law interpretation, without incurring liability 
problems further down the line. 
 
The authors then discuss in more detail (Section III) what a constitutional reading of 
Article 50 entails and how it influences the negotiations and future relationship 
between the UK and the EU. It is crucial for this endeavour, they argue, that we 
understand the TEU as a whole and in light of its organisational significance within 
the constitutional landscape of the EU. This requires a) an assessment of the goals 
and nature of Article 50 in the integration process, b) respect for existing 
constitutional standards, and c) the establishment of a constitutional basis for the 
new UK-EU relationship. 
 
As to the first, the article considers that the intentions of the drafters of Article 50 are 
significant and will likely play a role in how the provision is interpreted. These can be 
reconstructed from amendments proposed at the time and reveal that respect for the 
constitutional requirements of the withdrawing state is a key component of the 
process, and was deliberately included in the text of the provision.  
 
The authors also highlight, secondly, the need to respect existing rights. The Great 
Repeal Bill may not immediately repeal EU legislation applicable in the UK, but it will 
remove rights from their parent legislation and the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice 
of the EU (CJEU), abolish the primacy of EU law over inconsistent UK legislation, 
and offer no safeguard against future repeal. The EU member states and institutions 




EU, and therefore also UK, citizens to the fullest possible extent. This obligation is 
also binding on the UK until its withdrawal from the EU is complete. For instance, any 
attempt to expel EU citizens from the UK is likely to violate Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Articles 7 and 19(1) of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (EUCFR). The use of citizens on either side as ‘bargaining 
chips’ is prejudicial to both the Convention and the Charter, and as such the CJEU 
may, in light of existing case law, review the process. 
 
The article then examines the implications of its constitutionalist reading for future 
relations between the UK and the EU. As the withdrawal agreement laid down in 
Article 50(2) TEU is subject to a qualified majority vote in the Council and the consent 
of the European Parliament, there is no individual role for the member states, and the 
withdrawal agreement does not need their approval. While the prevailing view is that 
the agreement will deal only with the terms of withdrawal, and not future UK-EU 
relations, this ignores the fact that agreements concluded by the EU may have as 
their legal basis more than one provision in the EU Treaties. There are no significant 
barriers to a withdrawal agreement that also regulates the future legal basis of UK-
EU relations on a different basis from Article 50 TEU.  
 
In light of this discussion, the article considers what impact the constitutional 
requirements of the Union have on the Miller litigation (Section IV). All parties to the 
Miller case accept the referendum result as advisory. The referendum outcome itself 
does not constitute the United Kingdom's "decision" to withdraw from the EU. With 
Cameron and May stating unequivocally that the result will be accepted, however, the 
focus has been on the power of notification, and whether government or the 
parliament wields it. This emphasis does not concord with the stipulations of Article 
50 itself, which privileges the Member State's decision, taken “in accordance with its 
own constitutional requirements” – language not usually featured in international law 
– and makes reference to notification as a mere procedural provision.   
 
The Miller judgment (Divisional Court) held that prerogative power lies outside the 
purview of the Courts only because the Crown cannot alter domestic law by making 
or unmaking a treaty. The judges held that the European Communities Act (ECA) is a 
constitutional statute and that the Crown does not possess the power to vary 
domestic law through the exercise of prerogative powers.  
 
As per Article 50, withdrawal is also very different from accession to the EU or Treaty 
amendment. The decision itself is unilateral: there is no need for the EU or any other 
member state to agree to it. The EU Treaties will cease to apply after the two-year 
deadline, regardless of whether an agreement is reached. Even if the British 
parliament disagrees with the terms of any agreement, it will need to approve it, or 
there will be no agreement at all. It is therefore incorrect to suggest, the authors 
argue, that Parliament will be able to have its say at the end of the process. Because 
of the deadline, Article 50 provides that it is the decision to withdraw which needs to 
be taken in accordance with the Member State's own constitutional requirements. On 







The article also examines the issue of rights conferred by EU Law. It argues that it is 
incorrect to suggest that ECA rights are not genuine statutory rights or that the ECA 
is rather a conduit for rights established at the international level. When the British 
Parliament enacted the ECA it was fully aware of both the direct effect and 
supremacy of EU law. Moreover, since the authority behind these rights comes from 
their being enacted by the (sovereign) British parliament, they must by definition be 
statutory rights. As such, Parliament has the authority to maintain the rights of EU 
citizens insofar as these rights apply within the UK, irrespective of whether free 
movement or single market access are retained in any UK-EU agreement. It cannot 
however maintain the rights of UK citizens in other Member States, as to do so would 
require it to act extra-territorially. 
 
In addition to the effects of withdrawal, the role of parliament in it, and its impact on 
the rights conferred by EU law, all of which testify to the complexity of the endeavour, 
the article also sets out a broader, normative claim. Withdrawal from the EU, the 
authors argue, is not a zero-sum game with a single outcome subject to an easy 
cost-benefit analysis, but a complex political question of the highest order involving 
fundamental values. These conditions justify significant Parliamentary scrutiny of the 
Brexit process and would ideally warrant an Act of Parliament incorporating the 
withdrawal decision and any instructions for the Brexit terms considered appropriate 
by Parliament. 
 
The last important question the article addresses also arises from Miller, and touches 
on the question whether a duly notified decision to withdraw may subsequently be 
revoked. The wording of Article 50 is not clear on the point of revocability. It would, 
however, be politically and constitutionally incongruous for the EU not to accept a 
bona fide revocation of notification within the two-year timeframe if it occurred. 
Provided that any new decision not to withdraw is taken in good faith, therefore, the 
Article 50 clock could technically be stopped. 
 
The constitutional questions at stake in the process of withdrawing from the EU are of 
the utmost importance for the Union’s construction. It is the commitment to 
constitutional values that distinguishes the EU from other international organisations. 
These values will be put to the test during Brexit. The associated questions raise 
complex matters of EU constitutional law that must be determined in order for the 
Article 50 process to be conducted in accordance with the joint UK and EU 












This article considers the constitutional requirements and implications of Article 50 TEU for 
the European Union. It argues that it is essential to read Article 50 in light of the inherently 
constitutionalist features of the Treaty of which it forms part together with its drafting context, 
that of the Convention on the Future of Europe, as well as the substantive protections of EU 
constitutional law. The article demonstrates that substantial constitutional constraints are in 
place in EU law, which can affect four of the most significant debates in the withdrawal 
process, namely: the manner in which notification to withdraw from the Union is given; the 
revocability of a decision to withdraw; and the legal basis of the withdrawal agreement. 
These debates raise complex matters of EU constitutional law that must be determined in 
order for the Article 50 process to be conducted in accordance with the joint UK and EU 





Never before has a provision of EU law become so well known in such a short space of time 
as Article 50 TEU. In a seismic vote on 23 June 2016, the British people decided with a clear 
but by no means overwhelming majority that the United Kingdom should leave the EU. The 
"should" is important: in legal terms, the referendum was purely advisory. The outcome was 
unexpected, even by the Leave camp, and it is clear that the UK government (hereafter the 
Government) was wholly unprepared for the challenges that Brexit entails.1 
 
Article 50 TEU is a sparsely worded provision, which raises more questions than it answers 
and which is of course wholly untested.2 While litigation concerning the triggering of Article 50 
from the perspective of UK constitutional law is on-going in the UK,3 that litigation leaves to 
                                                
1 See, for example: ‘Labour Says UK Facing Brexit 'Unprepared and Ill-equipped'’, Sky News 
23/11/2016 <http://news.sky.com/story/labour-says-uk-facing-brexit-unprepared-and-ill-equipped-
10668913> accessed 10/12/2016; ‘Leaked Memo Says UK Government has no Plan for Brexit’, 
Aljazeera 15/09/2016, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/11/leaked-memo-uk-government-plan-
brexit-161115081621073.html> accessed 10/12/2016 ; ‘EU’s Schulz: UK Government was 
Unprepared for Brexit Vote’,  Associated Press 23/09/2016,< http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-eus-
schulz-uk-government-was-unprepared-for-brexit-vote-2016-9?IR=T> accessed 10/12/2016. 
2 While some prior withdrawals from the Union have taken place (Algeria, Greenland) these are of a 
very different kind. They concerned the granting of independence and home rule, respectively, to 
territories that belonged to Member States that remained in the Union, rather than the withdrawal of a 
Member State itself. Furthermore, both of these partial withdrawals took place well before Article 50 
was introduced and, indeed, even before a clearer aspiration for further political integration was set out 
in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. Even though some lessons regarding institutional cooperation may be 
drawn from these instances, therefore, these are largely limited: A F Tatham, ‘Don't Mention Divorce at 
the Wedding, Darling!’: EU Accession and Withdrawal after Lisbon’ in P Eeckhout, A Biondi, and S 
Ripley (eds), EU Law After Lisbon (OUP 2012) 148. 
3 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin); currently 
pending appeal before the UK Supreme Court in R (on the application of Miller and another) 




one side the meaning of key terms and aspects of Article 50 itself. Once the withdrawal 
process formally commences, though, it is clear that in addition to any concerns it may raise 
from the viewpoint of national law, it will be governed by the law of the European Union in a 
number of ways.  
 
This paper aims to contribute to the debate on the interpretation of Article 50. Our 
overarching argument is that withdrawal requires compliance with EU constitutional law if the 
EU is to preserve its sui generis character as a supranational order that creates rights and 
obligations for its subjects (institutions, Member States and private persons).4 In turn, the 
proposed constitutionalist reading has significant implications for the nature of the 
negotiations and the future relationship between the UK and the Union. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we explain why a constitutionalist reading of Article 
50 is essential (Section II). We then discuss in more detail what such a reading entails and 
how it influences the negotiations and future relationship between the UK and the EU 
(Section III). In light of this discussion, we consider what impact the constitutional 
requirements of the Union have on the Miller litigation, and beyond Miller, on the question of 
revocability of a duly notified decision to withdraw (Section IV).   
 
 
II. The Need for a Constitutionalist Reading 
 
It is often said that Article 50 was never intended to be used5 and that it was hastily drafted; 
yet its drafting process shows that it was seriously considered and debated. Whereas it was 
the Lisbon Treaty that ultimately brought this provision into EU law, Article 50 (or, rather, 
Article 59, as it then was) was negotiated within the Convention on the Future of Europe and 
formed part of the Constitutional Treaty. The text of the provision was changed substantially 
from the first6 to the final draft of the Constitution.7 Notably, while the first draft did not contain 
any limitations on the withdrawing state’s re-accession to the Union, two important provisos 
                                                
4 Case 26/72, Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1,12 
5 ‘Article 50 Was Designed 'NEVER to Be Used' - Says the Man who Wrote the EU Divorce Clause’ 
Sunday Express 23/07/2016, <http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/692065/Article-50-NEVER-to-be-
used-Europe-Brexit-Italy-Prime-Minister>, accessed 10/12/2016. 
6 European Convention, ‘Document from the Praesidium: Preliminary Draft Constitutional Treaty’, 
28.10.02, CONV 369/02. 





were added in the Constitution’s final draft: first, that the two-year period for the negotiations 
could only be extended by unanimity (Article 59(3)); and second, that a state wishing to 
withdraw would need to make a new application for accession, should it wish to re-join in the 
future (Article 59(4)). The Constitution’s withdrawal clause was adopted without any 
fundamental changes by the Lisbon Intergovernmental Conference, becoming Article 50 
TEU.8  
 
This historical context constitutes a first, immediate reason for adopting a constitutionalist 
reading. The fact that Article 50 enters the EU legal order at a constitutional moment is 
significant. It coincides with the point at which the Union attempted to draw up a 
constitutional framework of governance that went well beyond any other international treaty. 
Thus, its drafting context is not just one of Treaty change but of a distinctly constitutional 
change: in proclaiming common values, a binding Charter of Fundamental Rights, a 
commitment to the principles of democracy, and a system of checks and balances, the 
Constitutional Treaty gave rise to a form of what Wilkinson had called EU political 
constitutionalism.9 In this sense, Article 50 has an ‘inherently specific’ constitutional context, 
which sheds light on its interpretation.10  
 
Against this first, historical reason for an EU-focused, constitutionalist reading of Article 50, it 
could be argued that the British people have clearly rejected EU constitutionalism in their 
referendum vote. Prime Minister Cameron's achievement to find agreement on extricating the 
UK from "ever closer union" was considered inadequate. "Taking back control" was a 
predominant campaign theme, and it might be said to follow that Article 50 must be read in 
ways that accommodate that expression of popular will. One such way could be to 
emphasise the intergovernmental character of the withdrawal process, and to adopt an 
international-law-oriented reading thereof. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
                                                
8 Unfortunately, the minutes of the Lisbon ICG are not in the public domain. The Presidency 
Conclusions of the Brussels European Council of 21/22 June 2007, in which the main reforms to the 
Constitutional Treaty are discussed, only discuss the withdrawal clause in passing: ‘Title VI (former 
Title VIII of the existing TEU) will be amended as agreed in the 2004 IGC. There will in particular be an 
Article on the legal personality of the Union, an Article on voluntary withdrawal from the Union and 
Article 48 will be amended so as to bring together the procedures for revising the Treaties (the 
ordinary and the two simplified procedures)’: Brussels European Council, ‘Presidency Conclusions’, 
20.07.2007, 11177/1/07 REV 1, para 16, emphasis added. 
9 MA Wilkinson, ‘Political Constitutionalism and the European Union’ (2013) 76:2 MLR 191, particularly 
at 207-210, 221-222.  
10 See MW Dowdle and MA Wilkinson, ‘On the Limits of Constitutional Liberalism: In Search of a 
Constitutional Reflexivity’ (2015) NUS Law Working Paper 2015/009, 




(VCLT) would then take centre stage, insofar as it codifies customary international law.11 The 
differences with a constitutionalist reading are arguably significant. For example, on the 
vexed question whether the Article 50 notification is revocable, Article 68 VCLT provides an 
affirmative answer.12 On the question whether the Article 50 process is the only permissible 
Brexit route, on the other hand, Article 54 VCLT supplies a negative answer, in the sense 
that it juxtaposes withdrawal by consent of all the parties with withdrawal in conformity with 
the provisions of the treaty in issue.  
 
But while there can be an argument about the right hermeneutics, it is incontrovertible that 
the Article 50 interpretation must be singular. There could be a constitutionalist reading, or an 
international-law one, or some mix. What there cannot be is a reading by the United Kingdom 
which diverges from, yet co-exists with, that of the European Union. Withdrawal from the EU 
necessitates negotiation and, hence, dialogue. Even if the UK considered itself untied from 
the European Union, failure to leave based on the terms of Article 50 as mutually understood 
would be highly problematic. The UK might choose to adopt an international-law reading that 
does not concord with EU law or indeed a reading flowing from the ‘purely dualist’ character 
of the UK legal order, whereby repeal of the European Communities Act 1972 would, from an 
internal perspective, remove its obligation to observe EU law. We shall not go into the 
multitude of reasons why to do so would be unwise from the viewpoint of UK constitutional 
law, as these have been meticulously explained elsewhere.13 For our purposes, suffice it to 
say that neither of these two approaches to withdrawal would be legally practicable, because 
neither would be lawful from the perspective of the European Union unless they fully 
complied with its own constitution and values.14 Unilateral withdrawal would eventually place 
the UK in breach of EU law, thus immediately raising concerns about further litigation. An 
international-law based interpretation of withdrawal would have to meet EU constitutional 
requirements in full in order to be compatible with EU law.15 
 
                                                
11 On the procedural provisions that is not so clear: see F Capotorti, 'L'extinction et la suspension des 
traités, Académie de Droit International, Recueil des Cours, 1971 III, p 431 and p 562. 
12 "A notification or instrument ... may be revoked at any time before it takes effect". 
13 See S Douglas-Scott, ‘Brexit, Article 50 and the Contested British Constitution’ (2016) 79:6 MLR 
1019. 
14 Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, Commission and Others v Kadi, 
EU:C:2013:518, paras 67 and 97ff. 
15 Thus, it would need to be in practical terms the same as an EU constitutionalist interpretation, in 
order to be accepted by the EU under the principles set out in Kadi II, ibid, and para 131. See also 
Opinion of Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, delivered on 16 January 2008, in Joined cases C-402/05 P 
and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and 




Indeed, the reasons why the EU should resist any other interpretation are not only 
historical/political but also legal. Article 50 TEU is situated in a quintessentially constitutional 
place within EU law: as the Court famously put it in Les Verts, the Treaties form part of the 
Union’s ‘constitutional charter’.16 It must of course be noted that EU constitutional law does 
not always adequately reflect a distinct version of constitutionalism and has been criticised 
for its lack of direction and constitutional purpose. As Dieter Grimm has argued, EU law 
suffers from a problem of over-constitutionalisation, 17  in the sense that it labels as 
‘constitutional’ provisions that do not fulfil the functions of constitutional law, namely to 
safeguard a proper process of government.18 It is therefore important to highlight that Article 
50 is of a constitutional character not only in formal but also in substantive terms. When 
considering – to paraphrase Bruce Ackerman – what the constitution of the European Union 
actually constitutes,19 it would be impossible not to make reference to membership of and 
distancing from that Union, i.e. who takes part therein and who does not. One can hardly 
imagine provisions that are more ‘constitutional’ in character than those concerning the 
makeup, objectives, membership, and withdrawal from the EU. In regulating the latter 
process, Article 50 is directly constitutive of what the Union is. 
 
In turn, the interpretation of Article 50 affects the Union’s very identity as a constitutional 
order with specific commitments to fundamental rights, common values, and the rule of law.20 
To adopt any interpretation thereof other than a constitutionalist one would amount to an 
implicit refutation of that identity – an identity that distinguishes the Union from other 
supranational organisations.21  
 
The EU is expressly founded on constitutional values, enumerated as "respect for human 
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including 
the rights of persons belonging to minorities."22 It is obvious that a national decision, such as 
the UK’s referendum vote and the process of withdrawal that it triggers, may raise concerns 
about the degree of respect for many of these values. The potential effect of withdrawal on 
those values is such that the provisions governing this process must be subject to a 
constitutionalist interpretation: it concerns key questions of public interest for both the EU and 
                                                
16 Case 294/83, Parti Ecologiste “Les Verts” v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, para 23. 
17 D Grimm, ‘The Democratic Costs of Constitutionalisation: The European Case’ (2015) 21:4 ELJ 460, 
469-471. 
18 M Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (OUP 2003) 5-7. 
19 B Ackerman, ‘The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution’ (1984) 93 Yale LJ 1013, 1040. 
20 See Art 2 TEU. 
21 Van Gend en Loos (n 4); See also Wilkinson (n 9) 200ff. 




the UK. For the purpose of the argument, which this paper makes, there is no need to 
explore this at length.  We can simply take as an example the rule of law and respect for 
human rights. It is plain that the process of extricating the United Kingdom from the acquis 
communautaire is a complex, wide-ranging and intrusive legal process, which raises 
questions of respect for constitutional guarantees relating to the separation of powers and 
acquired rights. One need look only at the debate about safeguarding current rights to work 
and rights of residence of EU citizens in the UK, or their use as ‘bargaining chips’ in the 
Brexit negotiations.23 
 
The degree to which the rights of citizens are at stake in the Article 50 process puts the need 
for a constitutionalist reading most sharply into focus. These rights are not confined to human 
rights. The direct effect of EU law, be it in the form of provisions in the Treaties or EU 
legislation, is an enormous rights-generating factory, as the Court of Justice famously found 
in Van Gend en Loos.24 Often, EU law creates directly effective rights, enforceable in national 
law, without even using a rights vocabulary. Rights may simply be created through the 
imposition of obligations – on the EU institutions,25 the Member States,26 or private actors.27 
Take a policy and principle as fundamental as the free movement of goods. The relevant 
TFEU provisions do not, in their terms, confer any rights to free trade on private parties.  
They impose obligations on the Member States. But the direct effect and primacy of these 
provisions mean that both individuals and companies have an enforceable right to free trade 
that trumps any inconsistent national law.28 Indeed, the rights that EU law generates are 
beyond enumeration, or even classification. They are scattered throughout all EU policies 
and thousands of pieces of legislation.29 What follows is definitely incomplete, and strictly 
illustrative. There are rights to free trade, in goods and services;30 rights to free movement of 
                                                
23 See V Mantouvalou, ‘EU Citizens as Bargaining Chips’, UK Constitutional Law Blog 14/07/2016, 
<https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/07/14/virginia-mantouvalou-eu-citizens-as-bargaining-chips/> 
accessed 10.12.2016. 
24 Van Gend en Loos (n 4) 12. 
25 Perhaps most illustratively, see the creation of rights in the Kadi litigation (n 15). 
26 Van Gend en Loos (n 4). 
27 Case 36/74, Walrave and Koch v Association Union Cycliste Internationale, Koninklijke 
Nederlandsche Wielrenner Unie and Federación Española Ciclismo [1974] ECR 1405; Case C-415/93, 
Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association and Others v Bosman and Others [1995] 
ECR I-4921; Case 43/75, Defrenne v Sabena [1976] ECR 455. 
28 See Case 8/74, Dassonville [1974] ECR 837; Case C-171/11, Fra.bo SpA v Deutsche Vereinigung 
des Gas- und Wasserfaches eV, EU:C:2012:453. 
29 Andrew Duff notes that over 1200 regulations and directives currently apply to the United Kingdom: 
A Duff, ‘After Brexit: A New Association Agreement Between Britain AND Europe’, Policy Network 
Paper October 2016, <www.policy-network.net/publications_download.aspx?ID=9435> accessed 
11/12/2016, 8. 




capital and free establishment;31 rights to free movement of persons, accompanied by rights 
to work, to reside, to not be discriminated against.32 There are political rights and rights to 
equality;33 employment and social rights;34 consumer rights;35 environmental rights; 36 rights 
to agricultural subsidies;37 rights to have foreign judgments enforced;38 rights of immigration 
and family reunification;39 rights to privacy and data protection.40 Overarching all of these 
rights is the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which proclaims a number of them to be 
fundamental and ensures that EU law always respects human and fundamental rights.41 This 
system of rights is not a theoretical construct. It is part and parcel of the daily lives of millions 
of people, both in the UK and elsewhere in the EU.  
 
Brexit does not mean that all of these rights will be lost. The UK Government is proposing to 
put a Great Repeal Bill before Parliament42 which, contrary to its label, would keep most EU 
law on the statute book as a post-Brexit starting-point. However, some rights will inevitably 
be lost, as the Miller litigation established – e.g. the right to vote for the European Parliament, 
and to stand as a candidate in EP elections.43 Other rights are contingent on how the future 
relationship is constructed. That relationship can never keep all rights resulting from full 
membership intact, or else Brexit would make no sense. Given the United Kingdom's dualist 
                                                
31 Respectively: Article 56 and 49 TFEU. 
32 Articles 45, 21, 18 TFEU; Regulation 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 
April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union [2011] OJ L141/1. 
33 Respectively: Articles 20, 22 TFEU; Articles 21-26 EUCFR; Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 
November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation 
[2000] OJ L303/16. 
34 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers [1989] OJ C120/52; Articles 27ff 
EUCFR. 
35 Article 12 TFEU; Article 38 EUCFR 
36 Article 191 TFEU; Article 37 EUCFR. 
37 Article 171 TFEU. 
38 Council Regulation 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on   jurisdiction   and   the   recognition   and   
enforcement   of   judgments   in   civil   and   commercial matters [2001] OJ L12/1 (The ‘Brussels 
Regulation’). 
39 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States [2004] OJ L229/35. 
40 Articles 7 and 8 EUCFR. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L281/31. 
41 Article 51 EUCFR; Article 6 TEU. 
42 R Mason, ‘Theresa May's 'great repeal bill': what's going to happen and when?’ The Guardian, 
2/10/2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/oct/02/theresa-may-great-repeal-bill-eu-british-
law> accessed 11/12/2016. S Douglas-Scott, ‘The ‘Great Repeal Bill’: Constitutional Chaos and 
Constitutional Crisis?’ UK Constitutional Law Blog, 10/10/2016, 
<https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/10/10/sionaidh-douglas-scott-the-great-repeal-bill-constitutional-
chaos-and-constitutional-crisis/> accessed 11/12/2016. 




system, the rights that do survive will be rights under international law. They may be 
incorporated into domestic law, but will no longer benefit from the direct effect and primacy of 
EU law.44  
 
Moreover, in light of the uncertainty inherent in the political nature of the withdrawal process, 
which is one of negotiation, many EU law rights are rendered vulnerable. This is the case for 
those rights that cannot be maintained in the absence of their recognition by all Member 
States – e.g. rights of free movement, including those of UK citizens to work and reside in 
other Member States. What could also be lost is a certain level of entrenchment of EU law 
rights, particularly but not exclusively those which flow from the EU Treaties and the Charter. 
That is a function of the high political threshold for obtaining any amendment, let alone 
termination of such rights: all Member States have to agree, in accordance with their 
constitutional requirements.45 Even rights which merely result from EU secondary legislation 
may be more difficult to amend than rights conferred by domestic legislation.46 
 
This entrenchment has a strong counter-majoritarian streak. For example, even if many EU 
citizens who have benefited from free movement may be regarded as part of globalisation's 
elites, they do constitute a minority in fundamental rights terms. The Brexit referendum 
campaign, vote, and subsequent developments clearly constitute a threat to their rights, 
including their human rights, in a variety of ways. The impact of withdrawal on rights, 
particularly of those people living in the United Kingdom, but also of UK citizens in other 
Member States, commands an understanding of Article 50 that takes into account the role of 
rights in the EU legal order. The rights that EU law confers are a central feature of the EU's 
"constitution" and its construction over the years.47  It has in turn been a key aspect of 
membership of that Union.  
 
A reading of Article 50 that complies with EU constitutional requirements is, therefore, the 
only justifiable reading. Even if constituting the most fundamental form of rejection of EU law, 
the process of withdrawal must take place in accordance with the relevant EU law provisions, 
rules and principles. It would be flawed to assess the operation of Article 50 without paying 
due regard to its constitutional content and context, within the EU framework. 
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III. The Parameters of a Constitutionalist Reading: Interpreting the 
Legality of the Negotiations and Agreement from the EU perspective  
 
A constitutionalist interpretation of Article 50 requires that we go beyond an instrumental, 
textual or functional understanding thereof, and that we consider it as a whole and in the light 
of its organisational significance in the EU constitutional landscape. To do so requires: firstly, 
an assessment of the goals and nature of Article 50 in the EU integration process, which can 
be gleaned from its travaux préparatoires and, secondly, respect for existing constitutional 
standards, as highlighted in the Court’s case law. The latter emphasises respect for the rule 
of law; democratic standards of decision-making; and the protection of fundamental rights 
and the principle of equality. 48  Last but not least, it requires an understanding of the 
constitutional bases for the new relationship between the UK and the EU. These issues are 
discussed in turn.  
 
A. Article 50 and its travaux: shedding light on Article 50(1) 
While there is no explanatory memorandum or official guide to Article 50, the debate about its 
terms can be meaningfully reconstructed from the proposed amendments. These do not 
answer all interpretative questions, but at a minimum constitute evidence of some of the main 
concerns and political intentions that surrounded the provision’s creation. Indeed, the travaux 
are particularly useful in shedding light on the meaning of one of the most debated questions 
in the context of the Brexit debate: what constitutes a Member State’s valid decision to 
withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements, and to what 
extent should the Union care about it? At the same time, they further highlight that issues 
concerning rights, legal bases, and institutional balance were also considered important. 
 
The right of voluntary withdrawal from the Union was initially envisaged as Article 46 in 
Chapter X of the first part of the Constitution, entitled ‘Membership of the Union.’  The 
withdrawal clause was inserted into the Constitutional Treaty in light of the fact that the UK 
disagreed with the political aspiration of closer union that the Constitution set in motion.49 In 
turn, Member States that supported the constitutionalising project at the time, such as 
Germany (represented in the negotiations by then Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer), had 
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actively opposed its insertion.50  That opposition was shared by most of the other founding 
states, as well as by the EU institutions.51 Notably, a group of representatives from the 
European Parliament had proposed that, if the provision were maintained, further safeguards 
should be added to ensure that it does not privilege the withdrawing state.52  They had 
suggested, for example, that the article should balance the ability of a Member State to leave 
with a power for the Union to expel a Member State.53 Their reasoning was that ‘such a 
parallel right of the Union to expel Members would also reduce the risk of political 
blackmailing through the means of exit threats.’54  
 
A series of other amendments intended to render withdrawal more cumbersome had been 
proposed by Dominique de Villepin, who represented France.55  He had suggested that 
withdrawal be made conditional on a form of ‘irreconcilable differences’ between the 
withdrawing state and the EU after a Treaty change and that it should be required that a 
solution be sought within the Council first. He also asked that a limitation period be 
introduced before re-accession.56 Although he only suggested a two-year period, this seems 
to have been inspired by Alain Lamassoure’s vision of the Constitutional Treaty, which had a 
federalist character, strictly regulating withdrawal and including a 20-year limitation clause 
before re-accession. 57 Instead, of the initial accounts of Article 50, most delegates seemed 
to favour Robert Badinter’s proposal. As Tatham notes, this was one of the most pragmatic 
views on withdrawal expressed in the drafting process and was closest to its final text.58 
Nonetheless, the more onerous clauses Badinter had proposed, such as the payment of 
damages to the Union by the withdrawing state for any losses incurred through the 
negotiations, were not adopted.59  
 
Furthermore, the travaux confirm that to say that a Member State can withdraw in 
accordance with its own constitutional requirements is not to leave it up to that Member State 
to do as it pleases – the inclusion of that requirement in Article 50(1) suggests that only a 
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decision to withdraw in accordance with a state’s constitutional requirements is valid. During 
the negotiations of Article 50, the question of what should amount to a decision to withdraw 
was discussed extensively. Not only had there been proposals to qualify the possibility of 
taking that decision by making it dependent on Treaty change or compliance with EU values, 
as discussed above.  It had also been suggested that the phrase ‘in accordance with its own 
constitutional requirements’ should be removed altogether as it was not in the EU’s interest, 
as it entrusted it with the oversight of national constitutional requirements.60 Its retention is 
therefore significant. It suggests that respect for the constitutional requirements of a 
withdrawing state, whatever these may be, must underpin the withdrawal process, even if it is 
less expedient and more costly for the Union. That position is further supported by the 
inclusion of a clause of respect for national constitutional identities in Article 4(2) TEU, which 
in turn renders that respect part of its own constitution.  
 
Other important concerns had been the maintenance of individual rights, the protection of 
Union values and respect for international law. 61  One of the most interesting suggestions 
made was the introduction of an Article 50bis, which would create an alternative form of 
membership of the Union, for those members that wished to remain closely linked to the EU 
but did not share the political ambition of further unification, such as the UK. The proposal, 
which was made by Andrew Duff, Lamberto Dini, Paul Helminger, Rein Lang, and Lord 
Maclennan, would essentially have allowed for associate (rather than full) membership of the 
Union, entailing economic cooperation without ever closer union in other fields. 62 However, 
none of these amendments were adopted.  
 
From a constitutional perspective, the intentions of the drafters are significant and are likely 
to play a role in the interpretation of this provision, should it come before the Court of Justice. 
In the past, the Court made use of a teleological methodology that did not make reference to 
the drafters’ actual intentions.  As Lenaerts has explained, this was largely the case because 
the travaux of the Treaties were not available.63  However, as a conscious effort was made to 
render the consultation and drafting process of the Constitution for Europe as open and 
transparent as possible, references to the travaux are justified and constitutionally 
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welcome.64 A reading informed by the travaux contributes to ensuring that the subjects of law 
meaningfully identify as its authors through the representative process.65  Indeed, in light of 
the fact that many provisions of the Constitutional Treaty were copied into the Lisbon Treaty, 
the Court of Justice has become more receptive to interpretations arising from preparatory 
documents and these are likely to play an important role in the future.66 Thus, particularly 
since the Article 50 process is unprecedented, an adequate constitutional analysis must take 
account of the information regarding the content and goals of this provision that emerges 
from its drafting context.  
 
The latter reveals that the insertion of a unilateral right to voluntary withdrawal was far from 
uncontroversial. It is interesting that, while a series of very cumbersome clauses were not 
inserted into the provision, they had been voiced in the negotiations and enjoyed some 
support. As such, it is only to some extent true that Article 50 privileges the EU and its 
remaining members, as opposed to the withdrawing state. In fact, the version of the 
withdrawal clause that was retained was one of the most lenient (no limitation clause) but 
also the most vague. The vagueness that characterises Article 50 today was clearly linked to 
the delegates’ inability to reach agreement concerning the strictness of the withdrawal 
process and, hence, on a more precise wording for the provision itself, which can be 
attributed to very different perspectives on the goals and nature of the Constitutional Treaty. 
Still, as we have highlighted, the travaux of the Convention clarify two important issues: firstly, 
that respect for the constitutional requirements of the withdrawing state is a key component 
of an EU-constitutional-law-compliant reading of Article 50. Secondly, the broad discretion 
allowed in respect of Article 50(1) was intended to be counterbalanced by stricter conditions 
under Article 50(3) in order to prevent the withdrawing state holding the Union hostage in the 
negotiations. 
 
B. Article 50 and the Need to Respect Existing Rights: Substantive Constitutional 
Requirements for the Negotiations and Future Agreement 
In addition to the information that can be gleaned from the travaux, a constitutional 
interpretation of Article 50 requires engagement with the settled features of the EU 
constitutional order, the most relevant of which relate to respect for individual rights, as 
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highlighted earlier.67 That is so particularly insofar as agreement on the status of existing 
rights68 was not reached during the drafting process.  
 
The withdrawal of a Member State from the European Union creates significant possibilities 
of regression in terms of fundamental rights, and of a panoply of other rights of persons and 
companies. While the Great Repeal Bill may not immediately repeal UK legislation 
implementing EU directives and framework decisions;69 a) these rights will be removed from 
their parent legislation and the jurisdiction of the CJEU, resulting in reduced possibilities of 
judicial review; b) they will lose the primacy of EU law over inconsistent UK legislation; and c) 
there is no safeguard against future repeal. Arguably, this has implications not only for the 
UK but also for the Union, whose commitment to these rights and freedoms remains in place.  
 
As noted earlier, during the Constitutional Convention, a number of delegates had proposed 
amendments that safeguarded existing rights, which were not adopted.70  Furthermore, 
insofar as there is a basis in the Treaties for a Member State to exit the Union and the 
maintenance of existing rights has not been made a precondition for such exit, it is 
reasonable to assume that withdrawal can entail the loss of rights attached to membership. 
In turn, Article 50 does not provide any necessity of guarantees of the status of EU citizens in 
the withdrawing state and vice versa. However, none of this means that the Union’s 
institutions are constitutionally unconstrained in their actions during the negotiations in 
respect of these vulnerable populations.  
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Indeed, two of the Union’s objectives are to ‘uphold and promote’ its values in its external 
relations71 and to ensure the ‘well-being of its peoples’.72 Furthermore, Article 3(5) TEU 
provides that human rights must be ensured in the Union’s relations with third countries. The 
question of what level of protection for existing rights must be guaranteed is, therefore, 
crucial to the constitutionality of the negotiations and agreement, from the perspective of the 
EU. The main issues at stake concern the rights of EU citizens in the UK and UK citizens in 
the EU as well as the EU citizenship status of UK nationals.  
 
Insofar as the rights of EU citizens in the UK are concerned, EU institutions are of course 
likely to strive to maintain the application of the EU Treaties to them to the fullest possible 
extent. However, it is necessary to examine whether there is a constitutional obligation to do 
so, beyond political intentions. In our view, there clearly is: Union institutions and remaining 
Member States will be bound by the Treaties and the Court’s case law73 both during the 
negotiations and after the UK’s withdrawal. This raises a series of questions.  
 
Regression in the level of protection of human rights is a key issue. Respect for human rights, 
particularly as enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights, has underpinned the 
Court’s case law from its early years.74 From the EU perspective, therefore, any negotiation 
or agreement that does not guarantee, at a minimum, existing Convention rights will be 
inherently problematic. In addition, the relevant interpretation of human rights will often be not 
just that of the Convention, but that of the Treaties and Charter.75 EU institutions must look to 
the latter during, as well as after the negotiations – it forms the basis on which they will be 
held to account.76 In respect of many of the rights involved, the EU level of protection is 
particularly high.  
 
In her evidence on the human rights implications of Brexit, Kirsty Hughes rightly notes that 
Article 8 ECHR will be engaged, should the UK wish to expel EU citizens.77 The Convention 
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protects the right to reside and the right to family life of those who have made meaningful ties 
in the host Member State78 and construes these concepts broadly.79 In turn, the right to 
private and family life requires observance within EU law under Article 7 of the Charter as 
well as Article 19(1) thereof, which specifically protects against collective expulsions. 
Pursuant to Article 52 EUCFR, the level of protection offered by the Charter must meet the 
Convention standard – but it can also go beyond it.  
 
EU law is indeed more extensive than the Convention in its protection of the rights of citizens, 
so that the process of the negotiations and any potential agreement are likely to engage a 
heightened degree of constitutional scrutiny on the EU side. In particular, when considered 
together, Article 7 EUCFR and Articles 20-21 TFEU, in conjunction with secondary 
legislation,80 create a much stronger right to family reunification for EU citizens and their 
family members to enter the UK than the Convention has so far accommodated, having been 
fairly limited and inconsistently rendered.81 On this point, EU law has offered EU citizens the 
opportunity to reunite with their core family82 as well as other dependent family members,83 
provided that they meet certain conditions.84 In negotiating the future relationship between 
the EU and the UK, EU institutions and existing Member States can be held to account for 
failing to ensure, to the extent possible, compliance with these rights as understood in the EU 
legal order. Reaching an agreement without paying due regard thereto – not to mention one 
that breaches them outright – will be reviewable by the CJEU. Similarly, EU institutions and 
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existing Member States will not be in a position to negotiate a reduction in the level of 
protection of private and family life for UK nationals living in the EU.85  
 
The argument concerning the rights to private and family life can be taken further. As 
Mantouvalou has noted, the current position of EU citizens in the UK, and not just their 
position following withdrawal, raises questions of compatibility with the Convention.86 The 
uncertainty and instability that EU citizens in the UK – and, similarly, UK citizens residing in 
other EU Member States – face in the aftermath of the Brexit vote and, more specifically, the 
use of human beings as ‘bargaining chips’ in the negotiations, (i.e. refusing to guarantee their 
rights so as to extract a better deal), can be prejudicial to Article 8 ECHR in conjunction with 
Article 14 ECHR.87 These rights have a life in EU constitutional law under Articles 7 and 21 of 
the Charter as well. But the case for protecting against the perseverance of uncertainty for 
EU citizens is even stronger under the Charter: Articles 1 and 3 thereof protect the right to 
human dignity and the integrity of the person, respectively. In a situation falling within the 
scope of EU law, which Brexit inevitably is, those rights require respect by all existing 
Member States.88  
 
Until its official withdrawal from the Union on the terms of Article 50,89 the obligation to 
respect the aforementioned rights applies to the United Kingdom as well. To that effect, in its 
recent report on the safeguard of acquired rights during Brexit, the House of Lords has urged 
the Government to proceed with a unilateral guarantee of the rights of EU citizens in the 
UK. 90  At the same time, though, it must be pointed out that EU institutions have a 
constitutional obligation to respect these rights in their negotiations with the UK, too. This 
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raises significant questions about the lack of official guarantees of the status not only of EU 
nationals in the UK but also of UK nationals in the EU. 
 
Moreover, even where human rights issues are not at stake, arbitrary forms of regression of 
any vested rights (e.g. the free movement of persons or even the free movement of goods) 
can be constitutionally destabilising, to the extent that they are prejudicial to the principles of 
legal certainty and legitimate expectations – essential elements of a well-functioning 
constitutional polity.91 These principles form part of the EU constitutional order.92 While it is 
difficult to envisage particular outcomes of the negotiations that would be struck out on the 
basis of those principles alone in EU law, safeguards such as the promulgation of the results 
of the negotiations and adequate notice periods to those benefitting from EU freedoms, and 
who may be affected by changes to their status, may well be required. 
 
The final concern we wish to take up relates to the status of UK citizens post-Brexit and the 
loss of their EU citizenship.  Not only EU citizens in the UK and UK citizens in the EU, but 
indeed all UK citizens have so far been entitled to claim ‘civis europaeus sum’93 and the 
rights that come with that status.  It is settled EU law that citizenship of the Union is the 
‘fundamental status’ of nationals of the Member States.94 On the one hand, since the 
Treaties provide for voluntary withdrawal from the Union, it would be difficult to argue that the 
status of citizenship must be retained for UK citizens. On the other hand, it is important to 
refer back to the discussion of Article 50(1) in the travaux and to highlight the crucial nature 
of respect for constitutional requirements in doing so. To remove citizenship is not something 
that should be done lightly. As Hannah Arendt put it, the loss of the ability to belong and to 
claim rights within a political community amounts to the loss of the very ‘right to have 
rights’.95 Can, then, all UK citizens be stripped of their EU citizenship, even if they have not 
voluntarily renounced it?  
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The matter is not quite so clear. It is also not merely a question of UK law or of inter-state 
politics. It builds on case law of the Court of Justice that requires a degree of respect for EU 
citizenship.96 That case law provides that ‘by reason of its nature and consequences’ the loss 
of EU citizenship can fall within the jurisdiction of the CJEU.97 Despite being a necessary 
consequence of withdrawal from the EU, which is envisaged in the Treaties and hence would 
likely not (nor should it) be reviewed, the legality of the process of losing EU citizenship does 
trigger EU constitutional guarantees. If EU citizenship has, as Advocate General Sharpston 
put it in Zambrano, come to mean more than just cross-border movement but a ‘uniform set 
of rights and obligations in a Union under the rule of law’,98 then its removal presupposes 
close consultation with those it affects. It necessitates, in particular, compliance with common 
EU and UK values and general principles, including the rule of law, legitimate expectations, 
proportionality, and principles of democratic governance, such as consistent consultation with 
civil society. In other words, while the case law on this point is not unlimited, the loss of any 
form of citizenship – certainly one that has been enjoyed consistently, in its current form, for 
almost twenty-five years – merits a measured response by the parties to the negotiations and, 
ultimately, oversight by domestic courts and the Court of Justice alike, so as to meet existing 
safeguards of the EU constitutional order. 
 
It must be added that the current political discourse on the withdrawal process, particularly in 
the United Kingdom, stands in stark contrast with a constitutionalist approach to Article 50.  
The process is spoken of in purely intergovernmental terms, with the overriding aim of 
reaching the "best deal for Britain", particularly in terms of economic outcomes.99  Such a 
discourse completely disregards the fact that Brexit involves this seismic shock to individual 
rights - a shock whose severity depends on the outcome of the Article 50 process. That 
process, in turn, is by definition concerned not with the best deal for Britain, but with respect 
for the EU constitutional order – an order that, up until withdrawal, still includes the UK. 
Indeed, even though the Article 50 process is one by which a Member State seeks to remove 
itself from EU law, that does not in itself render the human rights that apply within EU law 
nugatory during that process.100  
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Similarly, while on the EU side politics has taken charge in the aftermath of the referendum, 
that is happening mainly in the intergovernmental structure of the European Council rather 
than following the constitutional processes and ideals of integration that characterised the 
drafting context of Article 50. The stance of prominent EU figures has been one of efficiency 
and expedience, even if it results in a ‘hard Brexit’.101 Yet, how hard Brexit can be does not 
just depend on political power in the negotiations and a drive to maintain the Union’s stability, 
but also on the legal constraints in place through the EU Treaties and case law, as 
highlighted above.  
 
Ultimately, what makes a constitutionalist rather than a purely intergovernmental approach to 
Article 50 most appealing is not so much that it is essential for EU institutions or that, 
technically, it is also required for Member States as it is within the scope of EU law but, rather, 
that the constitutional orders of the UK and the EU converge on many of the most crucial 
constitutional issues. Indeed, legislation not only in the EU but also in the UK protects against 
the use of nationality as a discriminatory premise.102 Furthermore, the UK constitution itself is 
not just about parliamentary sovereignty – the prima facie concern of the Miller case.  It also 
stands for the safeguard of individual rights and freedoms,103 checks and balances, and 
proper representation. The very reason for parliamentary sovereignty is the limitation of 
possible absolutism in the will of the Crown.104 Any removal of existing rights, from this 
perspective, entails clear dangers of which UK courts have been very mindful.105 As Lord 
Kerr has persuasively put it, if the government has ‘committed itself to a standard of human 
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rights protection...it should be held to account in the courts as to its actual compliance with 
that standard.’106  
 
After all, the constitutional order of the European Union stems from the common traditions of 
its Member States: it is neither autonomous nor created in a contextual vacuum. It is 
premised on respect for national constitutions, fundamental rights, and democratic values. It 
is indeed the product of years of integration between the Convention, the constitutions of the 
Member States and the goals that these have entrusted the EU with safeguarding.107 Failure 
to respect it at any point during the withdrawal process raises immediate concerns not only 
for EU constitutional law but also for UK constitutional law itself. 
 
C. Implications of a Constitutionalist Reading for the Legal Basis of the Agreement Detailing 
Future Relations 
Article 50(2) TEU lays down the procedure to be followed for the negotiation of an agreement, 
between the EU and the withdrawing state, "setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, 
taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union". A bare reading of 
the provision reveals some noteworthy points. The withdrawal agreement is subject to a 
qualified-majority vote in the Council, and needs the consent of the European Parliament.  
However, there is no individual role for the Member States, and the withdrawal agreement 
does not need their approval (it is not a "mixed" agreement).  Further, the "arrangements 
for ... withdrawal" are wholly undefined, except for the proviso that account should be taken 
of the framework for the future relationship.  This is unspecific language, which is open to a 
range of different interpretations. 
 
At the time of writing, the prevailing view appears to be that the withdrawal agreement can or 
will only deal with the actual terms of withdrawal, and that the future relationship will need to 
be negotiated post-Brexit, when the United Kingdom will have become a third country.108  
There is also speculation about a transitional period, which may or may not be part of the 
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withdrawal agreement.  As regards any future agreement, it is frequently pointed out that 
such an agreement is likely to be mixed, with all the attendant difficulties of securing approval 
by all Member States, in accordance with their constitutional requirements.109 
 
However, a constitutionalist reading of Article 50 requires that these various assumptions be 
subjected to a deeper analysis.  There is a whole body of law on EU competence, internal 
and external; on the reasons for mixed agreements; and on the appropriate legal basis for 
the conclusion of an international agreement.110 As no decisions have been taken yet on how 
withdrawal and future relations will be structured, it is too early to offer any in-depth 
suggestions.  Nevertheless, the existing body of law allows for some initial comments on the 
proposed course of action. 
 
A first question is the extent to which the withdrawal agreement could regulate the future 
relationship between the United Kingdom and the EU.  The wording of Article 50(2) instructs 
the negotiators to take account of the framework for the future relationship.  These are 
enigmatic terms, in that they do not spell out what is meant by this "framework", nor whether 
that framework needs to be part of a separate agreement.  Textually, all that can be said is 
that the withdrawal agreement should include references to the future relationship.  However, 
it is less obvious to read Article 50 as conferring competence on the EU to regulate, in the 
withdrawal agreement, both the terms of withdrawal and the full organisation of the future 
relationship.  That would appear to involve substantially more than "setting out the 
arrangements for ... withdrawal." 
 
It must however be noted that agreements concluded by the EU may have more than one 
provision in the EU Treaties as their legal basis.  In terms of EU legal principle, we do not see 
any significant barriers to a withdrawal agreement which also regulates the future relationship, 
on a legal basis different from Article 50 TEU.  If that future relationship were confined to 
trade matters, Article 207 TFEU would constitute the relevant provision.  If, however, the 
future relationship includes a range of EU policy areas in which the United Kingdom may 
wish to continue to cooperate with the EU, as could perhaps be expected despite all the talk 
about a hard Brexit, an association pursuant to Article 217 TFEU ought to be considered.  
The latter provision is as vague as Article 50, in that an association is barely defined: it 
involves "reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedure". The Court 
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of Justice has determined that an association agreement empowers the EU to guarantee 
commitments towards non-member countries in all the fields covered by the Treaties.111  The 
competence to conclude association agreements is, in substantive terms, the broadest 
external competence for which the EU Treaties provide.  There would therefore seem to be 
no compelling legal reasons for requiring the United Kingdom to withdraw from the EU first, 
before negotiating a new agreement on its future relationship. 
 
A further point to note is that, even if most association agreements are mixed agreements, it 
is doubtful whether the determination of the future relationship requires mixity. The 
justification for mixed agreements reflects the cardinal EU constitutional principle of limited 
and conferred powers. As clearly stated in Article 5(2) TEU, "competences not conferred 
upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States". Withdrawal, however, is a 
special case.  In all matters covered by the Treaties, the EU Member States have conferred 
their powers to regulate their relationship with the United Kingdom to the EU, simply by virtue 
of the UK's current membership.  Take immigration as an example.  The EU's competences 
to regulate immigration of third-country nationals are strictly limited, leaving the substance of 
immigration policies to national competence. However, as far as UK citizens are concerned, 
there is no such national competence, because UK citizens are EU citizens benefitting from 
free movement. If anything, any future agreement limiting free movement would effectively 
return competences to the Member States, rather than interfering with the exercise of an 
existing competence. Surely, it is fully within the EU's competence to act so as to return 
national competences. Perhaps this is also the implicit reason why Article 50 does not 
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IV. The Miller litigation: Government or Parliament? A Perspective from 
EU Constitutional Law 
 
Article 50(1) provides that "any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in 
accordance with its own constitutional requirements." Article 50(2) adds that the "Member 
State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention." As 
discussed earlier, the decision to withdraw is clearly a unilateral one, on which Article 50 
places no conditions other than that it has to be taken in accordance with the withdrawing 
state's own constitutional requirements. This qualification calls for some immediate 
comments. First, it is in line with the advocated constitutionalist interpretation of Article 50, in 
that it makes express reference to respect for domestic constitutional rules. Other 
international treaties, conventions and agreements which contain withdrawal clauses do not 
make such reference.113  They are based on a classical international-law paradigm which 
treats states, in legal terms, as unitary actors whose domestic constitutional arrangements 
are not a matter of international law. Second, the reference to constitutional requirements 
replicates such references in other Treaty provisions, for example those on Treaty 
amendments (Article 48 TEU), on accessions (Article 49 TEU), and on the EU's accession to 
the ECHR (Article 218(8) TFEU). In the United Kingdom, amendments and accessions 
require parliamentary legislation;114 the former may in addition require a referendum.115 Third, 
as noted above, the reference to the withdrawing state's constitutional requirements is in the 
TEU, and is therefore an EU law norm. Obviously, the precise nature of this requirement as 
well as its enforceability are open to debate. 116  As noted above, a series of amendments 
were proposed to codify what the ‘constitutional requirements’ might be. But given that the 
matter is at present intensely litigated in the UK, up to the highest level, it seems clear that 
the United Kingdom will have clearly determined what those requirements are, and one 
assumes will respect them. 
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The other point to note, before analysing the issues in Miller, is that Article 50 clearly 
distinguishes between the decision to withdraw (paragraph 1), and its notification (paragraph 
2).  The litigation in the United Kingdom is focused on whether the Government has the 
power to notify, without first going to Parliament, or whether instead Parliament needs to 
authorise this notification.  The Divisional Court stated that, for the purposes of the litigation, 
it was not useful to distinguish between the decision and the notification.117 This framing of 
the issue is a function of the particular chain of political and legal events before and after the 
Brexit referendum.  The EU Referendum Act (2015) did not spell out the legal consequences 
of the referendum, and the parties in Miller agree that it was merely advisory - in contrast of 
course with the prevailing political discourse throughout and after the campaign.  It is 
therefore accepted that the referendum outcome itself does not constitute the United 
Kingdom's "decision" to withdraw from the EU.  However, both the outgoing and incoming 
Prime Ministers, Cameron and May, have immediately confirmed that the referendum result 
needs to be respected, and that the United Kingdom must withdraw.118  This has put the 
focus on the power of notification, with a blog post by Barber, Hickman and King arguing, 
within days of the referendum result, that Parliament must be involved.119 The subsequent 
debate has squarely focused on notification of the decision to withdraw. It may be added that, 
at the time of writing, there is still no formal United Kingdom decision to withdraw from the EU 
- lest it be a secret one.  In Miller, the Government argues that the decision has been taken, 
but does not point to a formal act.120  One assumes that this refers to political statements 
such as "Brexit means Brexit".121 
 
However, this emphasis on notification does not concord with the stipulations of Article 50 
itself.  The starting-point, and key, is clearly the Member State's decision, taken in 
accordance with its own constitutional requirements, to withdraw from the EU.  This is 
language not found in other international treaties and conventions, which usually speak about 
termination, rather than withdrawal, and as mentioned do not require respect for the 
                                                
117 Miller (n 3) paras 10-11. 
118 ‘David Cameron Announces his Resignation – Full Statement’, The Telegraph 24/06/2016, 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/24/david-cameron-announces-his-resignation---full-
statement/>, accessed 19/12/2016; ‘Theresa May says 'Brexit means Brexit' and there will be no 
attempt to remain inside EU’, The Independent 11/07/2016, 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-brexit-means-brexit-conservative-
leadership-no-attempt-remain-inside-eu-leave-europe-a7130596.html>, accessed 19/12/2016. 
119 N Barber, T Hickman, and J King, ‘Pulling the Article 50 ‘Trigger’: Parliament’s Indispensable Role’ 
UK Constitutional Law Blog, 27/06/2016, <https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/06/27/nick-barber-tom-
hickman-and-jeff-king-pulling-the-article-50-trigger-parliaments-indispensable-role/> accessed 
11/12/2016. 
120 Miller (n 3), Appellant's Case, para 62(d). 




terminating state's own constitutional requirements. It is language which reflects the 
contested and intrusive nature of withdrawal, as shown by the travaux. 
 
The reference to notification in Article 50(2), by contrast, can be read as a mere procedural 
provision, the opening phrase to the process of negotiating a withdrawal agreement. The 
Member State shall notify the European Council, which will subsequently draw up negotiating 
guidelines.  There is nevertheless a clear and stark effect of notification: it starts the two-year 
clock ticking, after which effective withdrawal ensues (Article 50(3)). 
 
The distinction between the withdrawal decision and its notification is significant for a number 
of interpretative issues posed by Article 50, as is shown below. For example, the question 
whether the notification is revocable looks different from the question whether the 
withdrawing Member State is able to revoke its decision to withdraw. 
 
In what follows we do not propose to enter fully into the UK constitutional law debate that the 
Barber/Hickman/King blog and the Miller litigation have set off. Instead, we stand back a little 
from that debate, and look at it through an EU law lens. We consider that to be a useful 
exercise because the nature and effect of EU law deserve more consideration, for reasons 
we will explore. We start with a short summary of the Divisional Court's judgment in Miller, 
followed by three broad observations: on the effects of the withdrawal decision and its 
notification; on the rights conferred by EU law; and on broader normative questions 
associated with the respective roles of parliaments and governments in international treaty-
making. We then move on to a discussion of the revocability of the notification of a duly 
notified decision to withdraw and consider the significance of this question from the EU 
perspective, independently of the Miller judgment. 
 
A. The Miller Judgment (Divisional Court) 
In Miller, the Divisional Court premised its analysis on the sovereignty of the UK Parliament, 
and regarded the Royal Prerogative as the "residue" of legal authority left in the hands of the 
Crown. 122  It nevertheless recognised that the prerogative power is wide in international 
affairs, and outside the purview of the Courts, but found that that was precisely so because 
the Crown cannot alter domestic law by making or unmaking a treaty.  The Crown "cannot 
without the intervention of Parliament confer rights on individuals or deprive individuals of 
                                                




rights".123  The Divisional Court then turned to the direct link which existed between rights 
under EU law, and UK domestic law, through the combination of the direct effect and primacy 
of EU law, on the one hand, and the European Communities Act (1972) on the other.  The 
ECA was required to give domestic effect to EU law rights; is considered a constitutional 
statute; and has been amended whenever the EU Treaties have been amended. 124  The 
Divisional Court distinguished three categories of EU law rights which are given domestic 
effect: (i) rights capable of replication in the law of the United Kingdom; (ii) rights enjoyed in 
other EU Member States; and (iii) rights that, upon withdrawal, could not be replicated in UK 
law.125 The Court found that withdrawal would affect each of those categories of rights.  It is 
worth highlighting that, even as regards the first category, the Court found that it was no 
answer to the claimants' case to say that Parliament could always re-enact those rights, after 
withdrawal: "The objection remains that the Crown, through exercise of its prerogative 
powers, would have deprived domestic law rights created by the ECA 1972 of effect".126 
 
The Divisional Court then firmly rejected the Secretary of State's case, which was to say that 
the prerogative power to withdraw from the EU had been left intact by Parliament.  The Court 
considered that this interpretation disregarded the relevant constitutional background, which 
is that the ECA is a constitutional statute, and that the Crown does not have the power to 
vary the law of the land by the exercise of its prerogative powers. 127 The Crown's prerogative 
power operated only on the international plane. 128  A careful analysis of the ECA led the 
Court to the conclusion that Parliament intended EU law rights to have effect in UK law, "and 
that this effect should not be capable of being undone or overridden by action taken by the 
Crown in exercise of its prerogative powers".129  In the last part of its judgment, the Court 
established that its findings were not contradicted by the existing judicial authorities. 
 
B. The Effects of the Withdrawal Decision and its Notification on the Role of Parliament 
Part of the debate on Miller focuses on the nature and scope of the Government's treaty-
making powers, which include the making of treaties and the withdrawal from them.  Critics of 
Miller generally argue that there is nothing remarkable, in the United Kingdom's dualist 
system, about the power of the Government to terminate EU membership.  Some 
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commentators even treat withdrawal from the EU as completely analogous to the termination 
of double-taxation treaties.130 Those criticisms are difficult to sustain in the face of the legal 
character (let alone the breadth) of the rights which EU law confers, which we have already 
examined. However, there is also the peculiar way in which Article 50 sets up the withdrawal 
process, which shows that, in terms of any parliamentary role, withdrawal is very different 
from accession to the EU or Treaty amendment.  These differences have not been 
sufficiently articulated.  In particular, there seems to be a widespread misconception that, at 
the end of the Brexit negotiations, Parliament will at any rate have a chance to confirm or 
reject the results, and that there is therefore no need for it to have a say in the triggering of 
Article 50.131 
 
That is not how Article 50 structures the withdrawal process.  In contrast with Treaty 
amendments or accessions, withdrawal is unilateral.  There is no need at all for the EU as 
such, or the other Member States, to agree to it, in any shape or form.  That is the effect of 
the two-year deadline in Article 50(3): whatever the EU and the other Member States 
undertake, the State which has notified its intention to withdraw can let the two-year period 
expire, and that means that "the Treaties shall cease to apply to the Member State in 
question." Treaty amendments and accessions work in the opposite way.  They require, first, 
agreement among all Member States, and second, approval in accordance with each 
Member State's constitutional requirements. 132  It is only when the last Member State has 
completed those requirements that the amendments can enter into force or the accession 
take place.  We know this all too well, as both the Maastricht and Lisbon Treaties have been 
held up because of an initial failure of approval in some Member States; and the 
Constitutional Treaty was abandoned as a result of such a failure. 
 
Because of this two-year deadline, Article 50(1) provides that it is the decision to withdraw 
which needs to be taken in accordance with the Member State's own constitutional 
requirements.  On the conditions for the approval of the subsequent withdrawal agreement 
by the withdrawing Member State, Article 50 is silent, and for good reason, as 
constitutionality has been ensured at the outset. 
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With this in mind, it is important to think through the various ways in which the Brexit 
withdrawal process may play out, in terms of Parliament's powers.  First, the withdrawal 
negotiations may fail, leading to the United Kingdom effectively leaving the EU at the end of 
the two-year period.  Parliament of course cannot force the EU to accept any negotiated 
withdrawal agreement. Second, if the negotiations are successful, Parliament could approve 
or reject the withdrawal agreement.  But if it rejects, that does not stop Brexit from happening. 
Article 50 is clear in that regard: "failing [a withdrawal agreement]" the Treaties cease to 
apply after two years. Effectively, therefore, whether or not Parliament likes the Brexit terms, 
it had better approve the withdrawal agreement, for else there are no terms at all.  In theory, 
the withdrawal agreement could itself provide that it requires approval by Parliament, and 
that if Parliament rejects it, the withdrawal negotiations need to be resumed.  The two-year 
period can be extended.  But that option requires the EU's agreement, and a unanimous 
European Council decision. Again, this is not something within Parliament's control, even if it 
were to instruct the Government to negotiate such an agreement. 
 
In other words, it is incorrect to assume that, at any rate, Parliament will be able to have its 
say at the end of the withdrawal process.  Even in formal terms, that is not inevitably the case, 
and if there is a withdrawal agreement, in substance Parliament will be faced with either 
approving it, or mandating the hardest of Brexits. 
 
All this is distinct from the question whether notification is revocable.  As we argue further 
below, that is a question which applies, not so much to notification, but to the actual 
constitutional decision to withdraw.  The distinction is clear enough.  Assuming that "Brexit 
means Brexit", what is the role of Parliament, and at what point does it need to get involved?  
The above analysis speaks to that question.  It is an altogether different question whether the 
Brexit decision itself can be revoked, unilaterally, by the United Kingdom. 
 
C. The Rights Conferred by EU Law  
It is generally accepted that use of the Royal Prerogative does not allow the Government to 
interfere with rights under UK law, and in particular with statutory rights.  The Divisional Court 
took the effect of the withdrawal decision/notification on EU law rights as critical to its 
analysis.  It established that there are three categories of EU law rights.133  First, those rights 
which Parliament could maintain or replicate post-Brexit, for example employment and 
                                                




equality rights. Second, rights which UK citizens and residents have in other Member States.  
Those rights could be maintained in the post-Brexit relationship between the UK and the EU, 
but that depends on the terms of the withdrawal agreement and any further agreements.  
Third, rights which will inevitably be lost, because they are conditional on membership - the 
prime example being the political rights to vote for the European Parliament, and to stand as 
a candidate in EP elections. 
 
Miller's critics argue that the rights conferred under EU law are not genuine statutory rights.134  
They say that the ECA is a mere conduit for rights which are located on the international 
plane. This is a consequence of the dualist nature of the UK constitution.  One may call this 
‘the dualism critique’. Notwithstanding Van Gend en Loos and Costa v Enel, 135 directly 
effective EU law rights have force of law in the United Kingdom on the sole basis that 
Parliament has given them that force in the ECA.  The fact that the rights are international in 
nature is evidenced by the reference in Section 2(1) ECA to those rights as they exist "from 
time to time".  It is for the Government to vary these rights, the critics argue, through its 
participation in EU law-making. Indeed, the rights are also contingent on action by other 
Member States (e.g. another Member State could withdraw, and thereby terminate the rights 
of UK citizens in that state). Likewise, the Government can decide to withdraw from the EU, 
which effectively will put an end to at least some of these rights.  That is simply a function of 
the Royal Prerogative in terms of negotiating international treaties.  The ECA is there to give 
domestic effect to the EU Treaties, and the rights which those Treaties (and EU legislation) 
confer.  Without the ECA, there could be no domestic effect.  That does not mean that the 
Government is incapable of using the Royal Prerogative in such a way that membership 
comes to an end. 
 
A first reply to this dualism critique would revolve around the need to recognise that, when 
Parliament enacted the ECA, it was fully aware of the direct effect and primacy of EU law, 
and therefore of the concept that EU law is, of its own force, domestic law. Article 2(1) ECA 
provides that all  
 
"rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time created 
or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures from 
time to time provided for by or under the Treaties, as in accordance with the 
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Treaties are without further enactment to be given legal effect or used in the 
United Kingdom shall be recognised and available in law, and be enforced, 
allowed and followed accordingly."   
 
This provision surely recognises that EU law conceives of the rights which it confers as fully 
integrated into domestic law. Parliament did not qualify the direct effect and supremacy of EU 
law; it confirmed it, and ensured that it could work in accordance with EU law principle.  
 
However, there is a more significant reply to the dualism critique.  It is inherently 
contradictory, and one could say that it is post-truth, or involves having one's cake and eating 
it. If indeed the United Kingdom has remained completely dualist, notwithstanding EU 
membership, then the only conceivable basis for EU law rights in UK law is the ECA. The 
rights, as they exist in UK law, cannot be anything but a product of Parliament's enactment of 
the ECA. They are pure statutory rights.  Parliament itself has not listed those rights.  Instead, 
it has chosen to "outsource" their definition, amendment, even creation to this international 
organization called the EU, of which the United Kingdom is a member and in the institutional 
framework of which the Government (and occasionally Parliament itself)136 have a role to 
play.  This is something Parliament can do as it is fully sovereign.  But the only reason for 
giving effect to those rights in UK law is the ECA.  What else are they then but statutory 
rights? The more one emphasises an absolute form of dualism, the more incontrovertible it is 
that EU law rights are, in the United Kingdom, statutory rights. 
 
The contingent nature of the rights that EU law confers is also inadequate for criticising Miller.  
It is not clear whether this criticism is different from the claim that the rights are ambulatory, 
in the sense that they change "from time to time".  Of course, many rights under EU law are 
contingent on the legislation which the EU adopts. It is the Government which participates in 
the adoption of such legislation, through its membership of the Council of Ministers. But the 
Council does not act alone, and UK citizens are represented in the European Parliament, 
which is the co-legislator.  At any rate, the UK Government cannot adopt EU legislation on its 
own, whereas the Government's claim in Miller is that it can, singlehandedly, trigger 
withdrawal.   
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More important, however, is that the fundamental rights which EU law confers (understood in 
a neutral sense) are provided for by the EU Treaties and by the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.  Those rights can only be amended by way of Treaty change, and this requires 
amendment of the ECA, and thus Parliament's legislative approval (Section 1(1)).  This 
means that the reference in Section 2(1) to rights provided "from time to time" does not 
include those Treaty and Charter rights, which are therefore not contingent or ambulatory: 
they are provided for in the EU Treaties, each of which Parliament has incorporated by 
amending the ECA. 
 
A further criticism of Miller concerns the category (ii) rights: those which UK citizens and 
residents have in other Member States. The criticism appears aimed at limiting the number of 
rights which are necessarily affected by withdrawal.  Category (i) rights can be replicated by 
the UK Parliament, acting alone.  If category (ii) rights are not rights under UK law - as the 
argument goes - then only category (iii) rights are left (such as political rights concerning 
elections for the European Parliament), as rights which cannot be autonomously replicated.  
It is not clear how far the argument stretches as the Claimants are rightly saying that this 
leaves intact the claim that at least some rights are affected. 
 
At any rate, the attack on category (ii) rights misses its target.  The Divisional Court called it 
"divorced from reality".137  It found that Parliament "knew and intended that enactment of the 
ECA 1972 would provide the foundation for the acquisition by British citizens of rights under 
EU law which they could enforce in the courts of other Member States".138  That must 
definitely be the case, but in fact there is more to the category (ii) rights than that.  It is by no 
means excluded that they are enforced under UK law, before the domestic courts, as 
practice shows.  A clear example is Viking Line.139  This was a reference from the Court of 
Appeal (England and Wales) on the exercise of the right of establishment by a Finnish 
company in Estonia.  The fact that the International Transport Workers Federation, which 
was allegedly interfering with Viking Line's right of establishment in another Member State, is 
based in London, led to the English courts having jurisdiction, pursuant to the Brussels 
Regulation.140  That jurisdiction was not disputed, and Viking Line was ultimately successful 
in part of its freedom-of-establishment claim. The case shows that internal-market and free-
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movement cases may come before the courts of a Member State, even if they are concerned 
with restrictions imposed by a different Member State.  The category (ii) rights are therefore 
just as much part of the rights protected by the ECA as the other categories. 
 
This is important because it answers the claim that, even if the internal market and free 
movement were not part of the post-Brexit arrangements, Parliament could nevertheless 
maintain the relevant rights insofar as they apply within the United Kingdom.  For example, 
Parliament could allow EU citizens to continue to establish themselves in the UK.  However, 
it could not maintain the rights of UK citizens and residents in other Member States, because 
it would then need to act extra-territorially.  Those rights will be lost unless they are part of 
the post-Brexit arrangements with the EU, which Parliament does not control. 
 
The conclusion must be that the rights conferred by EU law are statutory rights, some of 
which (the "fundamental" ones) are not contingent or ambulatory in the sense that Parliament 
has expressly enacted them in the ECA. In fact, as Laws LJ put it in Thoburn v Sunderland 
City Council: ‘It may be there has never been a statute having such profound effects on so 
many dimensions of our daily lives.’141 Withdrawal from the EU means that Parliament cannot 
re-enact a substantial number of those rights in the absence of new arrangements with the 
EU, which Parliament does not control.  Some of the rights will inevitably be lost, because 
they are dependent on full membership. 
 
 
D. A Normative Approach 
Our third comment on the Miller litigation focuses on the wider normative questions 
associated with the role of Government and Parliament in the Article 50 process.  Most of the 
academic debate on Miller obscures such questions rather than attempting to answer them. 
The picture painted is one of a series of legal technicalities, embedded in judicial precedent 
and complex legislative language.  However, the question about constitutional authority to 
withdraw from (as opposed to acceding to) a supranational organisation with the kind of 
dimensions the EU has, is wholly unprecedented.  The Royal Prerogative is clearly strongest 
in foreign affairs, but for the United Kingdom there can hardly be a bigger question of foreign 
affairs than EU withdrawal.  Indeed, it is in very large measure not a question of "foreign" 
affairs at all, for reasons which are obvious and which we have attempted to articulate, at 
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least to some extent, above.  In most other Member States, this would be plainly a 
constitutional question, and not one of foreign affairs, because the constitution enshrines EU 
membership.142  If the final outcome of the Miller litigation were that the Government can, 
without involving Parliament, decide to withdraw the United Kingdom from the EU, an 
external observer would be justified in wondering what is left of parliamentary sovereignty in 
the UK. 
 
Other jurisdictions are also struggling with the tension between the traditional and standard 
mechanism of acting on the international plane, and the fact that so much international action 
today is not merely about international relations, but aims to coordinate or even command 
domestic policies.  The EU is one of them, as the CETA and TTIP trade negotiations show. 
The lack of transparency of those negotiations, and of democratic (parliamentary) scrutiny 
has been heavily criticised, leading to some positive, though still inadequate change. 143 The 
TTIP negotiating mandate was published; the European Parliament is now given at least 
some level of access to the negotiation documents; and the Commission conceded that 
CETA is a mixed agreement, requiring domestic parliamentary approval in the Member 
States, with the Wallonia crisis as a consequence.  Even the French Government, 
traditionally a strong proponent of executive dominance in foreign affairs, is advocating 
fundamental change of EU trade policy in terms of transparency and democratic scrutiny.144  
In a different, but equally relevant respect, the Lisbon changes in the processes for EU 
Treaty amendment also reflect the shift away from executive dominance: the ordinary 
revision procedure involves a Convention which includes representatives of national 
parliaments and of the European Parliament (Article 48(3) TEU).  A further example of the 
shifts in the conduct of foreign affairs is the extent to which the German Parliament has 
claimed a role in EU affairs, particularly as regards EMU.145 
 
Luebbe-Wolff, former judge at the German Constitutional Court, has neatly framed the 
fundamental constitutional question with which our liberal democracies are currently faced: 
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international negotiations such as CETA and TTIP are in substance "about" legislation.146  
They concern a wide range of matters which, in domestic law, are legislative in nature.  It is 
therefore unsustainable, from a democracy perspective, to leave those negotiations 
exclusively in executive hands. Indeed, the Leave campaign's slogan about taking back 
control, arguably the principal driver of the referendum outcome, reflects the level of general 
unease with the growing transfer of law-making to the international plane. 
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to offer a full critique of the single major defence of 
executive dominance in foreign affairs: that such affairs are about reciprocal bargaining for 
which executives are best equipped, and which cannot be conducted in parliamentary 
chambers.147 It is a defence which dominates the current political discourse. Prime Minister 
May will not give a running commentary on the Brexit negotiations in Parliament, because it 
would wholly undermine the Government's ability to conclude the best possible deal for 
Britain.148 However, even the most superficial analysis of what is at stake in the Brexit 
negotiations reveals the defects of such a conception.  
 
Withdrawal and the determination of the future relationship between the United Kingdom and 
the EU are not a zero-sum game, which can be subjected to an overall cost-benefit analysis.  
They involve a series of deeply political decisions on a range of incommensurables. For 
example, whether the United Kingdom keeps free movement, or some degree of it, has 
nothing in common with the question whether it wishes to continue to cooperate in the field of 
counter-terrorism; the acceptance of some form of jurisdiction of the EU Court of Justice has 
no connection with the choice between a customs union and a free-trade-area; payments into 
the EU budget are completely distinct from keeping the European Arrest Warrant.  Each of 
those policy choices is distinct and different, and deserves proper democratic deliberation. 
Just imagine that all of these choices, with all of their consequences for domestic legislation 
in the relevant field, and for the rights and obligations of citizens, non-citizens, and 
companies, can simply be made by the Government, with no Parliamentary involvement 
other than the final decision, once a withdrawal agreement has been negotiated, to accept 
the "deal", or to reject it and risk the hardest of Brexits. 
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Those considerations justify significant Parliamentary scrutiny of the Brexit process.  They 
warrant an Act of Parliament which incorporates the withdrawal decision as provided for in 
Article 50(1), and any instructions Parliament considers appropriate for the negotiation of the 
Brexit terms.  It is to be hoped that the Supreme Court will endorse the principled Divisional 
Court judgment which, although it did not construe the case as normatively novel and 
unprecedented, was nevertheless attuned to the deep constitutional significance of this 
litigation. 
 
E. Revocability of the Decision to Withdraw, beyond Miller: Is Article 50 Forever or Can the 
UK Really Change its Mind?  
The last important question that has arisen in respect of Article 50 from the Miller litigation 
relates to the revocability of a notification under Article 50(2). Before the Divisional Court, the 
parties to the Miller case had accepted that the notification is irrevocable. As noted 
elsewhere, though, the question of revocability is largely irrelevant to the outcome of the case, 
which turns on the question of whether parliamentary sovereignty is prejudiced – and as we 
have already suggested, that may be so even if the decision is revocable.149 The case for the 
involvement of Parliament in the UK withdrawal process is strong, regardless of whether the 
notification can be revoked at a later stage or not. Nevertheless, the question remains alive, 
and of critical legal and political importance. To what extent is a duly notified decision to 
withdraw revocable insofar as EU constitutional law is concerned – or, to use Lord Pannick’s 
now famous analogy in Miller, must the bullet, once fired, necessarily reach its target?150  
 
The wording of Article 50 is not clear on the point of revocability. While, as Jean-Claude Piris 
has put it, ‘intentions’ can change,151 Article 50(2) does not concern the notification of a mere 
political intention, but of a decision to withdraw taken in accordance with a Member State’s 
constitutional requirements. In turn, an intention of this kind has a clear legal meaning and 
constitutional implications for the European Union, as laid down in Article 50(3), namely the 
commencement of a two-year process for exit.  
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The possibility of a withdrawing state changing its mind about leaving can be read into this 
provision in two ways: instead of an agreement to leave the EU, an agreement not to leave 
the EU can be reached amongst the parties. The future relationship with the EU of the state-
no-longer-wishing-to-withdraw following the negotiations would then be merely a 
reaffirmation of the application of the Treaties to that state. This would be a legally intricate 
solution but nonetheless imaginable. Alternatively, the state-no-longer-wishing-to-withdraw 
and its counterparts could unanimously agree to extend the negotiations indefinitely and, 
eventually, to insert a protocol into the Treaties to the effect that the notification of withdrawal 
under Article 50 has been revoked. As such, even on a strict reading of Article 50, there are 
some possibilities for changing the course of action during the process.  
 
However, neither of these options amounts to a possibility for a state unilaterally to revoke its 
notification. We fully agree with Paul Craig’s point that if a Member State bona fide changes 
its mind about leaving, it would be absurd for the European Union – and indeed for other 
Member States – to force it to withdraw based on the assumed irrevocability of Article 50.152  
We also agree with Sarmiento that it would ‘make no sense’ for other EU Member States not 
to accept such a change of heart, in light of the political and economic repercussions that a 
withdrawal would cause to the EU overall.153 Article 50 can certainly be stopped if everyone 
believes that that would be in their common interest. The problem is that it becomes far less 
straightforward if that is not the case. Indeed, it is only meaningful to discuss revocability of a 
duly notified decision to leave the Union if the withdrawing state can legally compel everyone 
else to accept the revocation.   
 
In our view, the distinction between the decision to withdraw and its notification is again 
critical. A Member State is entitled to decide, in accordance with its constitutional 
requirements, to withdraw from the EU. If that Member State re-considered that decision, 
within the two-year timeframe, it would not only be absurd but also unconstitutional for the 
Union not to accept a bona fide revocation of the notification. 154  The reference to 
constitutional requirements in Art 50(1) suggests that, in order to revoke the notification, the 
withdrawing state would simply need to show that the decision to withdraw is no longer 
compatible with its constitutional requirements, in that a new decision has been taken.155 
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Depending on what the constitutional requirements are, that could mean the rejection of the 
decision to withdraw by Parliament only, by Parliament and referendum, or by the 
Government following a referendum, as the case may be.156 A vote in the Commons or a 
second referendum may therefore be required.157 It must be emphasised, though, that in 
order for a new decision not to withdraw to reverse the withdrawal process, that decision 
would need to be about withdrawal altogether and not about the rejection of a specific 
agreement.  
 
There is of course a need to avoid abuse of the Article 50 process. The overall structure of 
Article 50 could be conceived of in the following way.  As noted above, it is clear from the 
travaux that the provision should retain the withdrawing state’s right of unilateral exit from the 
Union. While a series of amendments had been proposed that were intended to make the 
conditions of withdrawal stricter (e.g. making withdrawal conditional on Treaty change158 and 
inserting an explicit requirement of compatibility with international law159), these were not 
adopted. Article 50(1) entitles the withdrawing state to take a decision to leave simply ‘in 
accordance with its own constitutional requirements.’ The other Member States and the 
Union itself have no say in the taking of that decision or in its notification under Article 50(2). 
Additionally, Article 50 does not make the withdrawal conditional on an agreement. The two-
year negotiation period mentioned in Article 50(3) simply enables the EU and the withdrawing 
state to reach an agreement. At the same time, if they do not wish to, or find themselves 
unable to do so, it provides a safety valve for both parties. The withdrawing state is at liberty 
not to have any further association with the Union. In turn, the remaining Member States hold 
the cards as to whether the negotiations will be extended.  
 
To some extent, therefore, the structure of Article 50 tilts the scales in favour of the EU at the 
negotiation stage. But it could not be otherwise. In light of the autonomous power to decide to 
withdraw in accordance with its own constitutional requirements that Article 50 affords the 
withdrawing state, it is logical that the provision then balances that discretion with stricter 
conditions upon notification. If the decision to withdraw could be revoked unilaterally after a 
valid notification had been communicated to the European Council, the withdrawing state 
could simply stall the negotiations by using that possibility to its benefit if it found it difficult to 
negotiate the agreement it was hoping for. The scope for abuse is clear: a state wishing to 
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withdraw could notify, engage in a two-year negotiation, withdraw that notification and then 
re-notify and repeat the process. That would have the effect of holding the Union and other 
Member States hostage to an extended negotiation without engaging the unanimity 
requirement set out in Article 50(3). And it is precisely that possibility that, in light of the 
travaux, the drafters of the provision had sought to prevent. 
 
At the same time, though, the constitutional case for forcing a Member State to withdraw 
from the Union if it bona fide wished to remain is weak. The possibility of abuse would be 
prevented by the requirement that withdrawal of the notification should be in good faith. At 
this stage, the extent to which the withdrawing state would be required to prove that it is 
acting based on a genuine change of heart is difficult to predict. In light of the fact that EU 
law has a distinct, but fairly limited doctrine of abuse of law160 and has never encountered 
that question in similar circumstances, the matter may need to be litigated before the Court of 
Justice. Still, provided it is in good faith, a unilateral revocation of the decision to withdraw 
should be possible. If a Member State could not remove its notification after changing its 
mind, and was thus forced to leave upon the conclusion of a two-year period under Article 
50(3), that would effectively amount to an expulsion from the Union – a possibility that was 
considered and rejected during the travaux.161  It would also be contrary to the principles of 
good faith, loyal cooperation,162 the Union’s values163, and its commitment to respect the 
Member States’ constitutional identities.164   
 
Thus, overall, provided that there is a new decision not to withdraw that is taken in good faith, 
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The constitutional questions at stake in the process of withdrawing from the EU are of the 
utmost importance for the Union’s construction. It is the commitment to constitutional values 
that distinguishes the European Union from other international organisations. These values 
are put to the test during Brexit. As we have sought to demonstrate, it is essential to read 
Article 50 from a constitutionalist viewpoint: its context is one of constitutionalisation and its 
implications will mark national constitutions and the postnational constitutional structure of 
the European Union at the most basic level, irrespective of whether one considers it a 
radically pluralist, unifying federal, or more mildly integrationist one. Article 50 raises 
important constitutional concerns not only for the withdrawing state - an issue that thrives in 
the UK blogosphere - but also from the perspective of the EU and its identity as a new legal 
order that creates rights and duties and safeguards them through accountable institutions, 
rather than being merely an international treaty signed by states. A constitutionalist reading 
of Article 50 brings into sharper relief the fact that the withdrawal process cannot be one that 
is entirely at the mercy of politics. It is governed by specific constitutional stipulations on the 
EU side as well. They necessitate respect for the UK’s constitutional decision to withdraw; 
but, at the same time, due respect for rights as foundational pillars of the Union and, and for 
other EU constitutional values such as the rule of law and democratic governance.  
 
In turn, it would be flawed to assume that constitutional questions pertaining to withdrawal 
from the perspective of the United Kingdom can really be addressed by excluding the 
constitutional dimensions of these questions from the EU side, except partially and 
temporarily. In light of the integrated nature of the EU and the UK, the EU constitution is both 
shaped by – and greatly affects – many crucial constitutional features of the UK’s own legal 
order, as important as human rights, legitimate expectations and constraints on public power.  
 
Our suggestions are therefore far from revolutionary. They entail, rather, respect for basic, 
and highly convergent, constitutional structures that have underpinned the relationship 
between the UK and the EU so far. They can be subsumed under the rubric of the rule of law 
and commitment to the democratic process. Indeed, the relationship between respect for 
constitutional guarantees and meaningful deliberative action in the public sphere is 
inherent.166 It is one on which both the UK and the EU constitutional orders are premised. It is 
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important that constitutional oversight of the withdrawal negotiations is ensured on both sides 
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